On December 17, 2011, Kim Jong-il's seventeen-year rule came to an end as he reportedly succumbed to a heart attack. Nearly fifty hours after the event, the North Korean propaganda apparatus sprang into action, informing the world of Kim's passing and proclaiming Kim Jong-un, twenty-nine years old, the "great successor." Moving at a rapid pace, the transition of power appears to have gone smoothly as the young Kim received the titles of supreme leader (ch'eogo ryo'ngdoja) and supreme commander (Choson inmin'gun ch'oego) of the armed forces. An entirely different set of signals has highlighted what appears to be a collective leadership that will advise Kim and facilitate his consolidation of power.
Going forward, Pyongyangwatchers will begin to key in on a number of issues central to the survival of this new regime. Has the leadership paradigm of one central decision-maker been replaced by something new? What challenges does Kim Jong-un face to consolidating his power? How will the party-military relationship evolve? What is the prognosis for near- and medium-term stability of this new regime?
At the time of Kim's death, the North Korean leadership was moving through the second phase of a three-phase succession. This phase, which was launched with the Third Party Conference in September 2010, was to mark a period of on-the-job training for the heir apparent. It was also the phase in which the regime was to be rewired in order to accommodate a post-Kim Jong-il leadership configuration. In the third phase, Kim Jong-un would be appointed to additional senior party leadership bodies and receive the titles of power, much as his father did in the early 1990s.
( Council of Foreign relations 2011)
3. Economic value
The Nation's international trade deficit in goods and services increased to $52.6 billion in January from $50.4 billion (revised) in December, as imports increased more than exports.
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Goods and Services
- Exports increased to $180.8 billion in January from $178.2 billion in December (revised). Goods were $128.6 billion in January, up from $126.7 billion in December. Services were $52.2 billion in January, up from $51.5 billion in December.
- Imports increased $233.4 billion in January from $228.7 billion in December (revised). Goods were $196.1 billion in January, up from $191.8 in December. Services were $37.3 billion in January, up from $36.9 billion in December.
- For goods, the deficit was $67.5 billion in January, up from $65.0 billion in December (revised). For services, the surplus was $14.9 billion in January, up from $14.6 billion in December.
Goods by Category (Census basis)
- The December to January increase in exports of goods reflected increases in capital goods ($1.3 billion); automotive vehicles, parts, and engines ($1.1 billion); and foods, feeds, and beverages ($0.1 billion). Decreases occurred in other goods ($0.5 billion); industrial supplies and materials ($0.3 billion); and consumer goods ($0.2 billion).
The December to January increase in imports of goods reflected increases in automotive vehicles, parts, and engines ($2.4 billion); industrial supplies and materials ($1.1 billion); foods, feeds, and beverages ($0.4 billion); and consumer goods ($0.2 billion). A decreases occurred in other goods ($0.1 billion). Capital goods were virtually unchanged.
Services by Category
- Exports of services increased $0.7 billion from December to January. The increase was mostly accounted for by increases in other private services ($0.2 billion), which includes items such as business, professional, and technical services, insurance services, and financial services, travel ($0.2 billion), royalties and license fees ($0.2 billion), and passenger fares ($0.1 billion). Changes in the other categories of services exports were small.
Imports of services increased $0.4 billion from December to January. The increase was more than accounted for by increases in other private services ($0.3 billion), other transportation ($0.1 billion), which includes freight and port services, and passenger fares ($0.1 billion). A decrease in travel ($0.1 billion) was partly offsetting. Changes in the other categories of services imports were small.
Goods by Geographic Area (Not Seasonally Adjusted)
- The goods deficit with Canada increased from $3.9 billion in December to $4.8 billion in January. Exports decreased $0.7 billion (primarily computer and automobiles, parts, and accessories) to $22.0 billion, while imports increased $0.2 billion (primarily crude oil and automotive parts and accessories) to $26.8 billion.
- The goods deficit with China increased from $23.1 billion in December to $26.0 billion in January. Exports decreased $1.3 billion (primarily civilian aircraft, engines, equipment, and parts and passenger cars) to $8.4 billion, while imports increased $1.6 billion (primarily footwear and apparel) to $34.4 billion.
- The goods deficit with European Union decreased from $9.6 billion in December to $8.5 billion in January. Exports decreased $1.7 billion (primarily civilian aircraft, engines, equipment, and parts and fuel oil) to $21.1 billion, while imports decreased $2.8 billion (primarily passenger cars and civilian aircraft) to $29.6 billion.
Argument: Attempts to get a new trading partner
4. Economic War with China
Taiwan
While relations between China and Taiwan are improved and improving, no meaningful
progress has been made on the key issue between the two states, which is if, when, and how
the island’s ultimate status—as an independent polity or as part of a “reunified” China—will
be determined. The chance of conflict across the Taiwan Strait will remain so long as this fun-
damental disagreement persists.
A cross-Strait conflict could take many forms, from a Chinese blockade of Taiwanese
ports, to varied levels of bombardment of targets on Taiwan, to an outright invasion attempt.
Should the United States engage directly in any such contingency, its goals would be to prevent
Chinese coercion or conquest of Taiwan and limit to the extent possible the damage inflicted
on Taiwan’s military, economy, and society. Core missions for the United States would include
preventing China from gaining air and sea dominance, and limiting the impact of Beijing’s
land-attack missiles, all achieved through flexible combinations of active and passive defense
and offensive action, to include the possibility of U.S. strikes on mainland targets associated
with the offensive against Taiwan, with all the attendant risks of further escalation. Indeed,
Conflict with China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence 3
China might well anticipate and seek to preempt such U.S. actions with attacks of its own on
U.S. assets in the region.
As China’s military modernization progresses, the U.S. ability to confidently accomplish
these missions is eroding. In the near term, China is deploying capabilities that threaten U.S.
land and sea power projection platforms—air bases and aircraft carriers—as well as Taiwan’s
own defenses. Absent an unlikely reversal in the ongoing rebalancing of military power in
the area, and even recognizing the very considerable difficulties in mounting an amphibious
assault against determined local resistance, a direct defense of Taiwan has already become a
challenge and is likely to become increasingly difficult in coming years.
Cyber-Space
Sino-U.S. cyber-war could be an aspect of—or prelude to—armed hostilities. Or it could
begin and stay in cyber-space. This case is confined to that domain, though with some danger
of triggering armed conflict.
Having conducted repeated intrusions into U.S. networks to exfiltrate sensitive data
without U.S. reprisal, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might seek and receive authority
to interfere with U.S. intelligence collection and dissemination on Chinese strategic-nuclear
programs. Chinese civilian leaders might not grasp that such operations would be defined
as cyber-attack by the United States and thus lead to retaliation. The attack could disrupt
systems the United States relies on for critical intelligence, including warning. If confident
that the PLA was the attacker, the United States might decide to retaliate. Given that corre-
sponding PLA intelligence networks are not easily accessed, and choosing to signal dangers of
escalation, the United States might retaliate against networks that support Chinese transport
systems, including commercial shipping as well as military logistics. The impact on Chinese
trade could be immediate. In addition, because the U.S. ability to observe Chinese forces had
been impaired, Pacific Command (PACOM) might be told to increase the readiness of its
forces. While China does not want armed conflict, it could respond by conducting “soft-kill”
attacks (e.g., link interference) on U.S. satellites that serve the Pacific command, control, com-
munications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) grid, to which
the United States responds in kind. Because both Chinese and U.S. network defenses are of
limited value against such large and sophisticated attacks, both sides might resort to counter-
attacks in hopes of restoring deterrence.
In the ensuing escalation, both China and the United States could suffer temporary but
major disruptions of critical networks, precipitating shocks in stock, currency, credit, and trade
markets. Although both sides avoid escalation to armed force, economic damage would be
considerable. Sino-U.S. cooperation on Iran would likely come to a halt, and the situation in
Korea could heat up. There are no lives lost—just extensive harm, heightened antagonism, and
loss of confidence in network security. There would be no “winner.”
South China Sea
There are numerous potential flash points in the South China Sea region. China’s assertion
of some degree of sovereignty over virtually the entire area rubs up against the rival claims of
numerous other states, and the areas around the Paracel and Spratly islands in particular have
witnessed limited clashes since the mid-1970s. A confrontation at sea could lead to a broader
conflict if, for example, an oceanic dispute between Vietnam and China escalated into a land
war between the two. The presence of a U.S. treaty ally, the Philippines, may elevate the stakes
4 Conflict with China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence
for Washington if some deep crisis arises in or around the South China Sea. China’s recent
claims that the region is part of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and therefore subject to
Chinese control, represent a test to global norms of free navigation and are a direct challenge
to U.S. interests in East Asia.
Depending on the nature and severity of a conflict, U.S. objectives could range from
enforcing freedom of navigation against a Chinese effort to control maritime activities in the
South China Sea, to helping the Philippines defend itself from an air and maritime attack, to
supporting Vietnam and shielding Thailand—another treaty ally—in the event of a land war
in Southeast Asia.
Any likely contingency in the South China Sea or Southeast Asia will make demands on
U.S. air and naval power to assure friendly dominance of the battlespace. A war on land could
create a demand for U.S. land forces—especially SOF and forced-entry capabilities.
China’s current ability to project substantial power into the South China Sea region is
limited; in particular, the PLA’s land-based combat aircraft lack adequate range to operate effi-
ciently so far from home. This assessment will change if China builds aircraft carrier and air-
refueling capabilities in the coming years. Direct defense in the South China Sea and South-
east Asia should remain a viable strategy for the next twenty years.
( Rand Corporation 2011)During the ‘cold war,’ a term used to describe the tension between communist and capitalist countries that lasted from 1947 to 1991, one of the fears was a military conflict between Russia or China and the U.S.
It didn’t happen. The potential of a military war instead morphed into an economic war.
The U.S. was winning hands down for a long time, but not so much anymore. It used to be that the U.S. was number one in pretty much everything: education, technology, standard of living, economic and military strength, admired world leadership. It was leading the rest of the world into the future with the demonstrative power of democracy and free markets, new technological breakthroughs in automation, computers, communications, energy, medicine, space travel, to name a few.
In recent years, a number of countries have surpassed the U.S. in specific areas, including consumer incomes, standard of living, and health care. The true economic powerhouse, however, has been China. Some of the statistics, and the speed with which they have changed, have been startling.
Over the last ten years China’s economy has surged past those of Canada, Spain, Brazil, Italy, France, and Germany, and is expected to pass Japan this year, to become the second largest economy in the world, behind the U.S.
Whether it’s manufacturing efficiency, high-speed rail-line technology, nuclear power plant construction, clean air energy technology, education, China is making impressive global inroads, even in areas where the U.S. still has significant dominance. Much of it has to do with China’s massive population, about which the U.S. can do nothing.
For instance, while U.S. Internet companies dominate global headlines, China now has the world’s largest internet market as measured by the number of users. Yet internet use has only penetrated 22% of the population versus 75% in the U.S. Meanwhile, U.S. Internet giants like Google, Yahoo, eBay, Amazon, Facebook and Expedia are experiencing problems trying to transport their dominance into the Chinese market. Part of it is obstacles placed in their way by China’s government, in support of China’s state-controlled corporations. The result is Chinese internet companies like Tencent, and Baidu, cannot help but become world leaders.
Here’s a statistic of more importance. U.S. universities will graduate 150,000 engineering students this year, while Chinese universities will graduate more than 500,000. I’ve had people tell me that’s an unfair comparison since China’s population is larger by approximately the same ratio. But that’s not the issue. The issue is the degree to which China has moved higher education to the top of its priorities, and the fact that 500,000 new engineers a year will probably come up with more high-tech innovations than 150,000 can.
China’s great leap forward has been going through the same phases the early U.S. experienced as it worked toward becoming the world’s dominant economy.
When we criticize China for the treatment of its underpaid and overworked labor force we sometimes forget that in the early years the U.S. also exploited its workers, even utilizing child labor in 14 hour days in garment, textile, and shoe factories, coal mines and crop fields, which gave the country its initial low-cost jump start economically.
It appears China is beginning to exit that phase and enter the next, of treating its workers better. In the past year Chinese workers have been allowed to form unions and strike for higher wages and shorter hours at various auto and electronics plants.
The west would probably like to think that is due to the pressure put on China to improve human rights. However, China has never shown any inclination to bow to pressure in any area. The fact is that the next phase of China’s economic development must be, as it was in the U.S., to develop a strong domestic economy. To do so it needs to have a more prosperous population of consumers, rather than depending on low cost exports to other countries.
Meanwhile, it can be said that China is eating America’s lunch, never taking its eyes off the goal, while we squabble among ourselves, paying no attention.
That’s unfortunate. As Sam Houston said in the U.S. Senate in 1850, “A nation divided against itself cannot stand.”
Yet, for the last 15 years the U.S. has divided itself in increasingly bitter time and energy-consuming political arguments: the morals of President Clinton, whether or not war should be waged to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq, whether the country’s current problems are due to the depth of the economic hole dug during the last administration, or ineptness of the current administration in pulling the economy out of the hole.
Meanwhile, China has kept its eye on the goal. It not only is making great economic strides, but on the financial side has become the world’s largest creditor nation, even as the U.S. has become the world’s largest debtor nation, with China holding much of its debt.
The U.S. needs to interrupt its angry divisiveness and name-calling long enough to recognize the portent of what is going on. Unfortunately, in this particularly acrimonious mid-term election year, that is not going to happen.
( Forbes Magazine 2012)
North Korea exported an estimated total of $2,235 million in
merchandise (down from $3,052 million in 2008) while importing $3,488 million (down from
$5,197 million in 2008). This created an apparent merchandise trade deficit of $1,253 million
(down from $2,144 million in 2008) with $1,095 million of that with China.37 China provides
more than half of North Korea’s imports. On the export side, South Korea was the largest buyer
of North Korean products, and China was second. However, if exports to and imports from South
Korea of raw materials, components, and products assembled in the Kaesong Industrial Complex,
just across the border in North Korea, are not counted, the vast majority of North Korean trade is
with China. Economic sanctions imposed by Japan and the United States have reduced their
respective trade with the DPRK to almost nothing except for intermittent humanitarian aid.
( Congressional Research Service 2010)
Argument: By establishing Trade relations with North Korea we make them less dependent on China's economy therefore limiting Chinese economy some what
Con
Theme: This will not work
1. America and North Korea have always been enemies
After several years of cross-border clashes, war broke out between the North and South on June 25, 1950. UN forces, led by the United States, intervened on behalf of the ROK; later that year China intervened on behalf of the DPRK. An armistice ending hostilities was signed in 1953. A peace treaty has not been signed. The fortified border, known as the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), has been the site of occasional military incidents. Maritime military incidents have also occurred, including North Korea’s seizure of the USS Pueblo in 1968. The Northern Limit Line (NLL), a sea boundary drawn by the UN Command, is contested by the DPRK.
( National committee on North Korea)
argument: America and North korea have always been enemies why should now be different
2. North Korea ties to Iran
The United States faces twin crises involving nuclear proliferation, as both North Korea and Iran seem poised to barge into the global nuclear-weapons club. (Indeed, there are indications that North Korea may have already done so, since it has processed enough plutonium to build as many as 13 weapons.) Washington's policy toward those two rogue states has followed a familiar pattern. The United States has no formal diplomatic relations with either country, and it has entered into negotiations with those regimes only with great reluctance and following intense prodding by long-standing U.S. allies.
That policy is unwise. It may be emotionally satisfying to refuse to recognize the current North Korean and Iranian governments, since one would be hard-pressed to identify two more odious regimes in the international system. All people who value freedom and basic respect for human dignity hope that those governments end up on the ash heap of history as soon as possible. Nevertheless, refusing to maintain any formal relationship with Iran and North Korea when those countries are poised to become nuclear-weapons powers is potentially very dangerous.
( Cato Institute 2006)
he release of U.S. diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks and North Korea's revelations about its uranium enrichment program have raised concerns about North Korea's proliferation activities, especially to Iran. "Most illicit nuclear programs depend very heavily on procurement networks, and North Korea has invested heavily in these supply networks ," says Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia nonproliferation program at James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. “I worry that North Korea's procurement network will be open for business with other countries," he says.
One leaked cable notes that some of the shipments for ballistic missiles and components from North Korea to Iran passed through China, raising questions over China's role in proliferation, but Lewis says the evidence on whether there is any Chinese state support for these activities is murky. Lewis recommends interdiction as the best policy option to prevent a proliferation threat from Pyongyang. "[R]ight now the outlook for negotiations is quite poor, so it makes a lot of sense to spend time on trying to physically restrain the North Koreans from selling things," he says.
What kind of nuclear cooperation is there between North Korea and Iran?
We really don't know the precise nature of the cooperation. We know that they were both customers of the Khan network [run by Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan], and that they have collaborated on ballistic missiles, but we don't have a lot of visibility into what kind of nuclear cooperation there might be between them. Which is not the same thing as saying it doesn't exist, just that we don't know.
Does the new evidence that North Korea has a uranium enrichment facility raise concerns that it might be helping Iran enrich uranium?
Certainly, or that Iran might be helping North Korea. The centrifuge design that the North Koreans got from Pakistan is very similar to the one that the Iranians got, and so just as the two countries' ballistic programs are based on common designs and can involve common work, you can easily imagine the same thing for the centrifuge program. The other thing that's important is that the most illicit nuclear programs depend heavily on procurement networks, and there's no reason to think that North Korea might not use Iran's procurement network or vice versa. So there's a lot of opportunity for collaboration, just so far we haven't found the evidence of it yet.
( Council of Foreign relations 2010)
3. American support of South Korea
U.S. President Barack Obama took steps this weekend to tightly embrace South Korea in the wake of the alleged attack by North Korea on a South Korean ship and the reluctance of China and Russia to acknowledge Pyongyang's perceived wrongdoing.
At the summit of top economic powers in Canada, Mr. Obama stood with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak to announce that the U.S. would postpone a handover by the U.S. to South Korea of wartime control of South Korean forces to 2015 from 2012, something conservatives in South Korea had pushed for. Mr. Obama also said he would lobby the U.S. Congress to ratify a free trade agreement, a deal the two countries signed three years ago but that has languished in the U.S.
The U.S. president also called on Sunday for the United Nations Security Council to acknowledge that North Korea had "engaged in belligerent behavior that is unacceptable to the international community'' in sinking a South Korean ship. He said the international community would continue to step up pressure on North Korea until it made a decision to follow international norms.
For Mr. Obama, the actions provided an opportunity to reinforce U.S. influence in northeast Asia. For South Korea and Mr. Lee, the moves are important as Seoul tries to persuade Beijing and Moscow to acknowledge that their ally North Korea is responsible for an attack on a South Korean warship in March that killed 46 sailors. The matter is now before the Security Council, where China and Russia hold veto power.
South Korean officials hope the council will produce an official statement of blame, but they don't expect China and Russia to go along with penalties against Pyongyang.
On Monday, North Korea issued a statement that it "must bolster nuclear capability" due to U.S. hostility, a comment that used wording seen before it tested nuclear explosive devices in the past.
Pyongyang has denied involvement in the sinking, which it has repeatedly blamed on South Korea and the U.S. Over the weekend, it repeated a call for Seoul to invite its military officials to see the evidence South Korea had collected, including remnants of a North Korean torpedo.
Separately, Pyongyang on Saturday set a September date for an election of party leaders that some South Korean analysts say may become the first public appearance of dictator Kim Jong Il's son Kim Jong Un, thought to be his designated heir.
In Toronto, Mr. Obama called South Korea "one of our closest friends" and said Mr. Lee handled the ship sinking and subsequent public-relations battle with North Korea "with great judgment and restraint." "Both on the security front and on the economic front, our friendship and alliance continues to grow," Mr. Obama added.
The Group of Eight leading economies meeting Saturday agreed to endorse the international investigation led by South Korea that found North Korea responsible for sinking the ship, called the Cheonan.
In a separate meeting Saturday, Mr. Obama urged Chinese President Hu Jintao to support strong action by the Security Council, said Jeff Bader, a senior director of Asian affairs at the U.S. National Security Council, after the meeting.
For South Korea, the wartime control transfer became a particularly urgent matter after the Cheonan sinking exposed command and communication problems in the South's military.
Seoul took peacetime control of its 600,000-person military from the U.S. in 1994 and the two countries agreed in 2006 that South Korea would take wartime control of its military from the current joint command led by a U.S. general. A transition plan took effect in 2007 with 2012 scheduled for the handover.
( Wall street journal 2010)
The Korean peninsula is on the brink of war today after North Korean artillery bombarded the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong, killing two marines, setting homes ablaze, and forcing residents to flee.
South Korea responded with its own artillery barrage and has raised its alert level to the highest setting short of war.
North Korea is threatening further military attacks against the South unless Seoul agrees to re-draw a disputed maritime border, while the South has warned Pyongyang that any further strikes will be met with "stern retaliation".
There are reports out of Seoul that South Korea will fire missiles if Pyongyang attacks again.
Speaking after a meeting of top security, defence and intelligence officials, Mr Obama said it was too early to consider any possible military action.
Mr Obama said he would consult with South Korea's president, Lee Myung-bak, on a response to the attack.
"I'm not going to speculate on military actions at this point," Mr Obama told ABC News America.
"This is just one more provocative incident in a series that we've seen over the last several months.
"I'm going to be talking to the president of South Korea this evening and we'll be consulting closely with them in terms of the appropriate response."
A White House statement after the meeting said: "The president reiterated the unshakeable support of the United States for our ally, the Republic of Korea, and discussed ways to advance peace and security on the Korean peninsula going forward."
The US-led UN command in South Korea is calling for urgent talks with the North.
Mr Obama said China, North Korea's only major ally, must communicate to Pyongyang that "there are a set of international rules they must abide by".
He added that North Korea was an "ongoing threat that has to be dealt with".
US defence secretary Robert Gates and South Korean defence minister Kim Tae-young agreed to coordinate any response to the North Korean action, the Pentagon said, adding that Mr Gates expressed his appreciation for the "restraint shown to date".
China has joined other countries in urging restraint and called for the resumption of the stalled six-nation nuclear talks.
"We hope the relevant parties will contribute to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula," Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei said.
Today Prime Minister Julia Gillard said the Australian Government was "deeply concerned" by the North Korean artillery strike.
"I condemn this attack and I send my condolences to the people of Republic of Korea following this attack," she said.
Calling the attack "deeply troubling" she praised South Korea for acting "with a great deal of restraint".
"The Government calls on North Korea to abide by international norms of behaviour ... and make a genuine contribution to abandon its nuclear programs."
( Abc news 2010)
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